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Abstract
I study credence goods markets when there are both selfish and conscientious
experts. The selfish expert is a profit maximizer. The conscientious expert wants to
maximize profit and repair the consumer’s problem. There are two classes of equi-
libria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equilibria. A consumer cannot
infer the expert’s type from his price list in a uniform-price equilibrium but can do
that in a nonuniform-price equilibrium. When the fraction of the conscientious ex-
pert is small, the selfish expert will be honest about the severity of the consumer’s
problem. When the fraction of the conscientious expert is large, the selfish expert
will cheat the consumer; overcharging the consumer whenever he offers to repair the
problem. Finally, more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss.
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1 Introduction
This article examines credence goods markets. A credence good is one whose quality
cannot be evaluated by the buyer even after the buyer has consumed it (Darby, 1973).
Suppose that the brake in your car is not working properly. A mechanic tells you that your
brake fluid reservoir is leaking and recommends you to replace it and refill the brake fluid.
Suppose that you accept the offer. Indeed, after the repair, the brake works properly.
You never get to find out whether a simple refill could have been sufficient to solve the
problem. In addition, you may not be able to verify whether the fluid reservoir has been
replaced as promised.
Asymmetric information in credence goods markets allows an expert to exploit a con-
sumer by exaggerating the problem. The existing literature studies market outcomes
when experts are pure profit maximizers. In reality, most of us have met experts whose
behavior is not consistent with profit maximization. Harvard Medical School asks stu-
dents to pair with patients. Each medical student follows along on the patient’s visits
to her specialists. The objective of the exercise is that walking in patients’ shoes may
teach students to care. Time magazine comments on this, saying, “At Harvard and other
medical schools across the country, educators are beginning to realize that empathy is as
valuable as any clinical skill.”1 It is hard to believe that every student trained by this
doctrine will become a doctor who merely wants to maximize profit. In our academic
profession, we all know professors who spend considerable time advising students in the
summer. They could have instead worked on their own papers or gone for vacation with
families. What profit can they make by sacrificing their time?
Psychologists and sociologists have recognized for a long time that job satisfaction
stems not only from financial rewards but also from intrinsic motivations. Herzberg (1959)
1“Teaching Doctors to Care”, TIME, May 29, 2006
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claims that a worker’s motivation is related to two factors: motivators and hygiene. Moti-
vators include achievement, the work itself, recognition, responsibility and advancement.
The hygiene elements include salary, company policies, supervision, interpersonal rela-
tions and working conditions. Friedlander (1964), Ewen (1966), Wernimont (1966), and
Knoop (1994) show that motivators are positively correlated with job satisfaction and
have significant influence on work performance.
As behavioral economics progresses, the limitation of the pure self-interested assump-
tion has raised more and more concerns. Various modifications on this assumption have
been considered. Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) analyze the strategic and intertemporal
interaction between two economic agents who have altruistic concerns for each other’s
welfare. Rabin (1993) incorporated fairness into game theory. In the fairness equilib-
ria, people want to be nice to those who treat them fairly but punish those who hurt
them. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) study the interaction between self-interested agents and
agents with a fairness concern. Alger and Ma (2003) analyze an optimal insurance con-
tract when some health care providers are collusive while some are honest about the
consumer’s treatment cost. Benabou and Tirole (2003) study a worker’s extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations.
This paper departs from the existing credence goods literature by including both self-
ish and conscientious types of expert in a market. The selfish expert is a profit maximizer.
The conscientious expert’s utility comes from profit and repairing the consumer’s problem.
This assumption has two interpretations. First, an expert may directly get satisfaction
from work itself as described by the psychology literature. Second, an expert may obtain
satisfaction from work indirectly through a reputation for competence. A newly estab-
lished car repair shop can build up a reputation of competence by solving consumers’
problems at a low price initially and can make a profit in the future through the good
reputation.
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I adopt the standard credence goods literature’s framework and ask the following
research questions. How does the presence of a conscientious expert influence the selfish
expert’s behavior? Can the consumer identify the type of the expert by either price lists
or recommendation strategies? Do more conscientious experts always result in a more
efficient market equilibrium?
In my model, there is a monopoly expert and a consumer. In line with Wolinsky
(1993), Fong (2005) and Emons (1997, 2001), it is assumed that the consumer has either
a minor problem or a serious problem, but he does not know which one it is. The novelty
of my model is that the expert can be one of two types: the conscientious type or the
selfish type. The expert knows his type and posts a price list for the possible repairs.
The consumer visits the expert; the expert learns the nature of the problem. Then the
expert either refuses to provide a repair or offers to repair the problem at a price chosen
from the posted prices. Upon hearing a recommendation, the consumer decides whether
to accept the repair offer. If the consumer accepts the repair offer, his problem is solved
at the quoted price.
I find two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equi-
libria. In a uniform-price equilibrium, both types of expert post the same single price;
therefore, the consumer cannot distinguish the expert’s type by price. The conscientious
expert repairs both problems, whereas the selfish expert only repairs the minor problem.
When the selfish expert treats the minor problem, he overcharges the consumer; that is,
he charges a price higher than the consumer’s willingness to pay for the minor problem.
The intuition behind the uniform-price equilibria is the following. The single price re-
sults in a positive profit for the conscientious expert when the problem is minor and a
loss when the problem is serious, but he will repair both problems. If the conscientious
expert’s profit from repairing the minor problem is high enough, the selfish expert will
mimic him by posting the same single price; the selfish expert will then repair the minor
4
problem but reject the serious problem to avoid a loss.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer can infer the expert’s type by the
price lists. The conscientious expert posts a single price and repairs both problems. The
selfish expert posts different prices. He recommends the high price when the problem is
serious; he randomizes between recommending the high price and the low price when the
problem is minor. The consumer accepts the low price offer and rejects the high price
offer with a positive probability. The conscientious expert’s single price is so low that the
selfish expert would not post that price even if the consumer accepts it with probability
one. The conscientious expert gets a high utility from repairing the problem. Hence, he
would not copy the selfish expert’s price list, trading off a high acceptance rate for a high
profit. The consumer rejects the selfish expert’s serious treatment offer with a positive
probability to prevent the selfish expert from always misreporting a minor problem as the
serious problem.
I select the most profitable equilibrium for both types of expert for comparative statics.
This is for two reasons. First, the conscientious expert always repairs the consumer’s prob-
lem in equilibrium. Besides satisfaction from repairing the problem, he also maximizes
profit. Second, a monopolist often has a stronger bargaining power against a consumer
and therefore the equilibrium is more likely to be in favor of the monopolist. When
the expert is very likely to be selfish, the most profitable equilibrium is a nonuniform-
price equilibrium. When the expert is very likely to be conscientious, the most profitable
equilibrium is a uniform-price equilibrium.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the expert’s type is revealed. Once the consumer
can infer the expert’s identity, the fraction of the conscientious expert, λ, does not play any
role in the nonuniform-price equilibrium. In contrast, the expert’s profit in a uniform-
price equilibrium increases in λ. This is because when the expert is more likely to be
conscientious, upon hearing a recommendation the consumer believes that his problem is
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more likely to be serious. Hence, his willingness to pay is higher. When λ is above some
threshold, the uniform-price equilibrium is the most profitable equilibrium.
Are more conscientious experts always better in terms of efficiency? To answer this
question, the efficiency of the most profitable equilibrium as a function of λ is analyzed. In
my model, it is socially efficient to have both problems repaired. In both the nonuniform-
price and uniform-price equilibrium regimes the minor problem is always repaired. Any
social loss is due to an unsolved serious problem. When λ increases, two effects influence
efficiency. On the one hand, the consumer has a higher chance to see the conscientious
expert who will always repair the problem. This improves efficiency. On the other hand,
when λ increases, the market is more likely to be in the uniform-price equilibrium regime.
Here, the selfish expert free rides on the conscientious expert and behaves worse than in
the nonuniform-price equilibrium regime. This leads to a larger social loss. Because of the
two opposite effects, efficiency is not monotonic in λ. When λ is close to one of the two
extremes, 0 and 1, more conscientious experts will result in a smaller social loss. When λ
is in a middle range, more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss.
Pitchik and Schotter (1987) study an expert’s fraudulent behavior in a setting with
exogenously given prices. They found a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the expert
randomizes between lying and telling the truth. Emons (1997, 2001) assumes that con-
sumers can verify whether the recommended service is delivered by the expert. Hence,
cheating becomes costly. In his equilibrium, an expert never cheats. In my paper, the
consumer cannot verify whether the recommended service is performed and therefore the
selfish expert is more tempted to cheat.
Wolinsky (1993) studies market equilibrium in a competitive setting wherein the con-
sumer can consult multiple experts by incurring a search cost. He identifies a specialization
equilibrium in which some experts repair a minor problem while others repair a serious
problem. In my model, there is a monopolist expert and the consumer does not search.
6
A uniform-price equilibrium resembles Wolinsky’s specialization equilibrium in the sense
that the selfish expert only repairs the minor problem and the conscientious expert repairs
both problems.
My article is closely related to Fong (2005). The main result in Fong is that the selfish
expert never misreports a minor problem as a serious one, but the consumer sometimes
rejects the serious treatment offer. The market inefficiency results from the consumer’s
rejection because the price is so high that it extracts the entire consumer surplus. My
paper models both selfish and conscientious experts. In contrast to Fong’s result, I identify
another source of market inefficiency stemming from the selfish expert’s refusal to repair
the serious problem. The selfish expert does so because the price is too low to cover the
treatment cost for the serious problem. These results contrast strongly against those in
Fong (2005).
Other important studies about principal-agent model with multiple types of agents are
also related to my article. Alger and Renault (2006) study a principal-agent model when
the agent is either honest or opportunistic. An honest agent reports his ability truthfully to
the principal while an opportunistic agent may misreport his ability to maximize material
payoff. They examine the optimal contract when the agent has two dimensional private
information: his type and his ability. My model is different from theirs in the following
ways. First, in their model, it is the uninformed party, the principal, moves first by offering
a contract to the agent. In my model, it is the informed party, the expert, moves first by
offering a price list. Second, the honest agent commits to reporting his ability truthfully
to the principal, while the conscientious expert does not commit to being honest about
the nature of the consumer’s problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 derives the uniform-price and nonuniform-price equilibria. Section 4 analyzes market
efficiency as a function of λ. Section 5 discusses market equilibrium in a competitive
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setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Players and payoff functions
There are two players in the model, a monopoly expert and a consumer. The consumer
has either a serious problem or a minor problem. The problem is serious with probability
α, with α ∈ (0, 1). Let s denote the serious problem and m denote the minor problem.
If problem i ∈ {m, s} is left unresolved, the consumer suffers a loss li, with lm < ls. The
consumer’s utility of having the problem unrepaired is −li. If he accepts a repair offer at
p, his payoff is −p.
The expert is either a conscientious type or a selfish type. The selfish expert only
cares about profit; his payoff from repairing problem i at price p is p − ri, where ri is
the treatment cost for problem i, with rm < rs. The conscientious expert cares about
both profit and the consumer’s well being; his payoff from repairing problem i at price p is
p−ri+kli, where k denotes the degree of conscientiousness. When k = 0, the conscientious
expert becomes the selfish expert. As k increases, the conscientious expert’s utility from
repairing the problem rises. This paper studies what incentives a few conscientious experts
may create for the selfish experts; therefore, the conscientious expert’s motive needs to be
sufficiently different from that of the selfish expert. Assume that k ≥ rs
ls
. When k ≥ rs
ls
,
the conscientious expert will repair the serious problem for free. An expert’s payoff is zero
if he does not repair the problem.
In line with earlier literature, the assumption is that it is efficient to repair both
problems, i.e., 0 < ri < li, i ∈ {m, s}. Let E(l) ≡ αls + (1 − α)lm. The equilibria under
the condition E(l) < rs are analyzed in sections 3 and 4. The case of E(l) > rs is discussed
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in section 5.
2.2 Information structure
It is common knowledge that the consumer has a serious problem with probability α,
with 0 < α < 1, and that the expert is a conscientious type with probability λ, with
0 < λ < 1. The consumer knows that he has a problem but does not know if it is serious
or minor. After diagnosing the problem, the expert learns whether it is serious or minor,
but this remains his private information. If the expert repairs the problem i ∈ {m, s}, the
consumer only knows that his problem is solved but does not know which treatment cost
ri is incurred. Implicitly, I have assumed that the resolution of a problem is a verifiable
or contractible event, but the type of repair for the resolution is not.
2.3 Extensive form
I consider the following extensive form game.
• Stage 1: Nature decides the severity of the consumer’s problem, li, i ∈ {m, s}, and
the expert’s type, according to the probabilities α and λ respectively.
• Stage 2: Nature informs the expert of his type; this information is unknown to the
consumer. Then the expert posts a price list (pm, ps), with pm ≤ ps.
• Stage 3: The expert observes the severity of the consumer’s problem; the severity
is unknown to the consumer. The expert either declines to repair the consumer’s
problem, or offers to treat the consumer at a price taken from his price list (pm, ps).
• Stage 4: If a price pi is offered by the expert, the consumer decides whether to
accept the repair offer. If the consumer accepts, he pays the price pi, a repair is
performed and the problem is resolved.
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3 The equilibria
To simplify the analysis, the expert is restricted to post only prices that are recommended
with a positive probability. An expert will never set a price below rm or above ls. Any
price p > ls will be rejected by the consumer. Any price p < rm will be accepted by the
consumer but will generate a smaller profit than p′ = p+ , for a sufficiently small  > 0.
Therefore experts are restricted to posting their prices in the range of [rm, ls].
One degenerate case of my model is when there is only a selfish expert, λ = 0. This is
studied by Fong (2005). This unique equilibrium is presented in Proposition 0.
Proposition 0. When the expert is always selfish (λ = 0), there always exists a unique
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome not involving weakly dominated strategies. In the
equilibrium, the expert posts a price list (lm, ls). He recommends lm in state m and rec-
ommends ls in state s. A consumer accepts lm with probability one and accepts ls with
probability lm−rm
ls−rm .
Proof. Refer to Proposition 1 in Fong (2005).
Recall that in this and the next sections, I assume E(l) < rs. The condition E(l) < rs
implies rm < lm < rs < ls. The expert can raise pm up to lm, the consumer’s willingness
to pay for the minor problem, because any pm less than lm is accepted regardless of the
consumer’s belief about the severity of his problem. Raising the price for the serious
problem ps has two effects. A higher ps results in a higher profit margin for repairing
the serious problem. Meanwhile, a higher ps may trigger a higher rejection rate by the
consumer because the consumer knows that the expert has an incentive to misreport the
minor problem as the serious problem when ps is high. The gain in profit margin dominates
the loss of rejection. Hence, the expert will set ps to ls, the consumer’s willingness to
pay for the serious problem. In Fong’s model, the continuation game after each price
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list is a proper subgame. The equilibrium in Proposition 0 gives the selfish expert the
highest profit among all the subgames and therefore is the unique subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium.
In Fong’s equilibrium, the expert recommends lm when the problem is minor and ls
when it is serious. This no cheating result is driven by the high price ps = ls. When
the price for repairing the serious problem, ps, is so high that it extracts all the surplus
of repairing the serious problem, the consumer will reject this offer completely if the
expert lies with an arbitrarily small probability. Rejection by the consumer is the source
of inefficiency. However, it is this rejection that disciplines the expert’s behavior and
supports the equilibrium.
Now the model is studied with both selfish and conscientious types of expert; that is,
λ ∈ (0, 1). Two classes of equilibrium outcomes are identified: uniform-price equilibrium
outcomes and nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1. (Uniform-price Equilibria). There is a continuum of equilibrium out-
comes in which both types of expert post the same single price. An equilibrium outcome is
indexed by p ∈ [lm, p], with p = αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) . In such an equilibrium, both types of expert
post a single price p. The conscientious expert always offers to repair the problem at price
p. The selfish expert offers to repair the minor problem at price p; he declines to repair
the serious problem. The consumer always accepts the repair offer p.
When both types of expert post the same price list p, the consumer cannot infer the
identity of the expert from a repair offer at p. Given the expert’s equilibrium strategy,
the consumer updates his belief about having a serious problem by Bayes’ rule after
recommended p; his expected loss from the problem is E(l|p) = αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) . Since E(l|p)
is at least the price charged by the expert, the consumer will accept this repair offer.
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A uniform-price equilibrium is supported by the following consumer beliefs after an
off-equilibrium repair offer p′ 6= p. If p′ < p, the consumer believes that the expert is
conscientious and, accordingly, his problem is serious with probability α, the prior. If
p′ > p, the consumer believes that the expert is selfish. In addition, his belief about the
nature of the problem depends on the comparison between p′ and rs. If p < p′ < rs, the
consumer believes that his problem is minor; if rs ≤ p′ ≤ ls, he believes that the problem
is serious with probability α.
I call the consumer with such beliefs a pessimist in the sense that he regards the expert
as selfish if he is recommended an off-equilibrium price higher than the equilibrium price.
The pessimist’s beliefs can be justified by the following argument: When the conscientious
expert’s benefit from repairing the problem is sufficiently large, he will not bear the risk of
rejection in exchange for a higher profit by raising the repair offer above p. In comparison
with the conscientious expert, the selfish expert has a stronger incentive to deviate to a
price above p.
The model requires that the consumer’s belief about the nature of the problem must
be consistent with his belief about the expert’s type. A conscientious expert will always
repair the consumer’s problem. Hence, the consumer will not update his belief about
the nature of the problem if he is recommended p′ < p. When p′ is greater than p, the
consumer believes that the expert is the selfish type who will not repair the problem when
the quoted price is smaller than the treatment cost. Hence, when p′ is smaller than rs,
the serious treatment cost, the consumer believes that he has a minor problem. When
p′ is at least rs, the selfish expert will always offer to repair a problem at p′. Hence, the
consumer’s belief about having a serious problem remains the prior, α.
According to the consumer’s off-equilibrium beliefs, he will accept a repair offer below
p and reject a repair offer above p. The consumer accepts p in equilibrium. Clearly, he
will accept p′ lower than p if p′ is offered by the conscientious expert. If the consumer is
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recommended p′ ∈ (p, rs), his expected loss, lm, is smaller than p′, therefore he will reject
such a repair offer. If the consumer is recommended p′ ≥ rs, his expected loss E(l), which
is less than rs, is smaller than p
′. Hence, the consumer will reject this repair offer as well.
Given the consumer’s optimal strategy after a repair offer p′, there is no profitable price
deviation for both types of expert.
The condition E(l) < rs implies that p is higher than the treatment cost for the minor
problem and lower than the treatment cost for the serious problem. The conscientious
expert commits to repair the problem even if it turns out to be serious. The selfish
expert will decline to treat the serious problem and overcharge the consumer for the
minor problem; that is, the selfish expert charges the consumer a price higher than his
loss from the minor problem if the problem is indeed minor.
The class of the uniform-price equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. The
conscientious expert cannot deviate to a higher price and convince the consumer to accept
the deviation. Suppose the conscientious expert deviates to p′ > p. The most favorable
reaction he can expect from the consumer is to accept p′ with probability one. However,
if the consumer accepts p′ with probability one, the selfish expert will also deviate to
offering p′. By the same logic, the selfish expert cannot deviate to a higher price and
convince the consumer to accept the price.
The upper bound of the uniform equilibrium price is αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) , which increases in
both λ and α. When the expert is more likely to be conscientious or the consumer is
more likely to have a serious problem, the expected loss from the problem conditional
on the recommendation p is higher. The consumer’s willingness to pay becomes higher
accordingly. When λ, the fraction of the conscientious expert, is one, the expert will
charge E(l) and always repair the consumer’s problem. This equilibrium is efficient and
allows the expert to take away the entire social surplus.
The existence of the conscientious expert creates an incentive for the selfish expert to
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cream skim the consumer with a minor problem and dump the consumer with a serious
problem. The unsolved serious problem creates a social loss due to the fact that the
uniform price is too low for the selfish expert to cover the serious treatment cost. This
result is in sharp contrast to Fong’s equilibrium. In Fong, it is the consumer who some-
times rejects the serious problem treatment offer and creates a social loss. The rationale
behind the consumer’s rejection is that the price for the serious problem is so high that if
the consumer accepts it with probability one, the selfish expert will always misreport the
minor problem as the serious one.
Uniform-price equilibrium outcomes are ranked by efficiency and profitability in Corol-
lary 1 and Corollary 2, respectively.
Corollary 1. Uniform-price equilibrium outcomes are equally efficient.
Under the condition ri < li, i ∈ {m, s}, it is socially efficient to have both problems
repaired. I measure market inefficiency as the social loss from an unresolved problem. In a
uniform-price equilibrium, a minor problem is always repaired whereas a serious problem
remains unresolved with probability 1 − λ. The social inefficiency of a uniform-price
equilibrium is therefore α(1− λ)(ls− rs). The distinctions among unform-price equilibria
are the distributions of wealth between the consumer and the expert.
Corollary 2. The most profitable uniform-price equilibrium outcome is one in which both
types of expert post a single price p = αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) .
In a uniform-price equilibrium, both types of expert post the same price p in [lm, p],
and the consumer always accepts a repair offer at p. Clearly, both types of expert’s profits
reach the maximum at p.
Thus far, the equilibria in which both types of expert post the same price are charac-
terized. Next, I will characterize other equilibria in which different type of expert posts a
different price list.
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Proposition 2. (Nonuniform-price Equilibria) There is a continuum of equilibrium out-
comes in which each type of expert posts a different price list. An equilibrium outcome
is indexed by ps ∈ [rs, ls] and pc ∈ [lm, pc], with pc = lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ). In the
equilibrium, the selfish expert posts a price list (lm, ps). In state s, the selfish expert offers
to repair the problem at ps; in state m, he offers to repair the problem at ps with probability
β = α(ls−ps)
(1−α)(ps−lm) , and repair the problem at lm with probability 1 − β. The conscientious
expert posts a single price pc, and always offers to repair the problem at pc. The consumer
accepts lm and pc with probability one; he accepts ps with probability γ =
lm−rm
ps−rm .
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the expert’s identity is revealed by his price list. If
recommended a single price pc, the consumer knows the expert is conscientious and the
consumer believes that his problem is serious with probability α, the prior. Because the
expected loss from the problem, E(l), is greater than pc, the consumer will always accept a
repair offer at pc. If recommended a price from the price list (lm, ps), the consumer knows
that he is seeing the selfish expert, who recommends ps when the problem is serious and
randomizes between recommending ps and lm with probabilities β and 1−β, respectively,
when the problem is minor. Clearly, the consumer is indifferent between accepting and
rejecting a repair offer at lm. Accepting lm with probability one is his best response. The
selfish expert’s probability of lying, β, makes the consumer indifferent between accepting
and rejecting a repair offer at ps. Hence, accepting ps with probability γ is the consumer’s
best response.
A nonuniform-price equilibrium is supported by the consumer’s beliefs after an off-
equilibrium price p′ /∈ {pc}
⋃{(lm, ps)} is recommended. If p′ < pc, the consumer believes
that the expert is conscientious with probability one and the problem is serious with
probability α. If p′ > pc, the consumer believes that the expert is selfish. In addition, he
believes that his problem is minor for p′ ∈ (pc, rs) and is serious with probability α for
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p′ ∈ [rs, ls]. The justification for the consumer’s beliefs after a repair offer p′ > pc is the
same as in the analysis for Proposition 1. According to the consumer’s beliefs, his optimal
strategy in the continuation game following p′ is to accept p′ < pc and reject p′ > pc.
Given the consumer and the conscientious expert’s equilibrium strategies, the selfish
expert does not have a profitable deviation in price. The conscientious expert’s prices,
pc, is so low that the selfish expert does not want to post pc although it is accepted with
probability one. Clearly, a price deviation less than pc is less profitable than the selfish
expert’s equilibrium price list, (lm, ps). A price deviation above pc will be rejected and
result in zero profit.
In the recommendation stage, the consumer accepts ps with probability γ, which makes
the selfish expert indifferent between recommending ps and lm when the problem is indeed
minor. Hence, it is the selfish expert’s best response to misreport the minor problem as the
serious problem with probability β. The selfish expert recommends ps when the problem
is serious because ps is big enough to cover the serious treatment cost, rs.
Given the consumer and the selfish expert’s strategies, the conscientious expert does
not have a profitable deviation. The conscientious expert will not mimic the selfish ex-
pert’s price list (lm, ps). A repair offer at ps is not attractive for the conscientious expert
because it will be rejected with a positive probability. A repair offer at lm will be ac-
cepted but is less profitable than the conscientious expert’s equilibrium repair offer, pc.
The conscientious expert will not deviate to a price other than the selfish expert’s price
list. A price deviation p′ less than pc will be accepted but is less profitable than pc. A
price deviation p′ above pc will be rejected and result in zero payoff.
The set of nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes can be reduced by the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion.
Corollary 3. Nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes that satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive
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criterion are those in which the selfish expert posts (lm, ps), with ps ∈ [rs, ls] and the
conscientious expert posts pc = pc = lm +
α
1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ).
When the conscientious expert’s price is pc, the selfish expert is indifferent between
posting (lm, ps) and pc. Consider a nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome in which pc <
pc. The conscientious expert can deviate to posting pc
′ = pc + , with  positive but
arbitrarily close to zero. If the selfish expert recommends pc
′, the most favorable response
he can expect from the consumer is to accept pc
′ with probability one. Because pc′ < pc,
the selfish expert’s highest possible profit from recommending pc
′ is strictly less than
his equilibrium profit. Hence, the consumer should be convinced that he is seeing the
conscientious expert upon being recommended pc
′ and therefore should accept pc′ with
probability one.
The Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion has reduced the set of nonuniform-price equilibrium
outcomes. All remaining nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes are indexed by ps, with
ps ∈ [rs, ls]. In the following analysis, I characterize the efficiency and profitability of the
equilibrium outcomes that have survived the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
Corollary 4. In the continuum of nonuniform-price equilibrium outcomes, the most prof-
itable equilibrium outcome coincides with the most efficient equilibrium outcome. In the
equilibrium, the selfish expert posts a price list (lm, ls). He recommends lm when the prob-
lem is minor and recommends ls when it is serious. The conscientious expert posts a single
price pc and always recommends pc. The consumer accepts pc and lm with probability one;
he accepts ls with probability γ
∗ = lm−rm
ls−rm .
The selfish expert’s equilibrium strategies are the same as in Fong (2005)(See Propo-
sition 0). In a nonuniform-equilibrium outcome, the selfish expert’s profit is
pis(lm, ps) = α(ps − rs)( lm − rm
ps − rm ) + (1− α)(lm − rm).
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Under the assumption E(l) < rs, pis increases in ps. This is because as the selfish expert
raises ps, the gain in profit margin dominates the loss of rejection.
The conscientious expert always repairs the problem in a nonuniform-price equilib-
rium. Hence, his rank of the equilibrium outcomes is also determined by the profit. The
conscientious expert’s profit is
pic(pc) = pc − [αrs + (1− α)rm].
Because pc increases in ps, pic(pc) increases in ps as well. Therefore, both types of expert’s
payoffs reach the maximum at ps = ls.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome, the conscientious expert always repairs the
problem. The social loss results from the consumer’s rejection of the serious treatment
recommendation, ps, offered by the selfish expert. The social loss of a nonuniform-price
equilibrium outcome is
W ≡ (1− λ)[α(ls − rs) + (1− α)β(lm − rm)](1− γ),
where β is the selfish expert’s probability of recommending ps when the problem is minor
and γ is the consumer’s probability of accepting ps. Substituting β =
α(ls−ps)
(1−α)(ps−lm) and
γ = lm−rm
ps−rm by their equilibrium values yields
W =
(1− λ)α[ps(ls − rs − lm + rm) + lmrs − lsrm]
ps − rm .
The derivative of W with respect to ps is −α(1−λ)(lm−rm)(rs−rm)(ps−rm)2 , which is negative. Hence,
the most efficient equilibrium outcome is the one in which ps = ls.
When ps increases, two conflicting forces are working on efficiency. When ps gets
bigger, the consumer will reject ps more often; hence, the serious problem is less likely
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to be resolved. This leads to a larger social loss. However, when ps is higher, the selfish
expert is less likely to misreport the minor problem as the serious problem. Therefore,
the minor problem has a higher chance to be resolved. The efficiency gain from the
minor problem exceeds the efficiency loss from the serious problem; consequently, the
efficiency increases in ps. The social loss of a nonuniform-price equilibrium results from
the interaction between the consumer and the selfish expert. In equilibrium, the selfish
expert takes the entire social surplus from repairing the problem when the repair offer is
accepted. Hence, the efficiency of an equilibrium outcome is aligned with the profitability
of the equilibrium outcome.
4 Are more conscientious experts always better?
Are more conscientious experts always better in terms of efficiency? To answer this
question, I need to select an equilibrium outcome as a benchmark to see how the efficiency
changes with the fraction of the conscientious expert, λ. The Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion
does not help with selecting among the multiple equilibria. I select the most profitable
equilibrium outcome as the benchmark for two reasons. First, the conscientious expert
always repairs the problem in equilibrium. Hence, like the selfish expert, the conscientious
expert prefers the most profitable equilibrium. Second, a monopolist often has stronger
bargaining power over a consumer. The equilibrium outcome is more likely to be in favor
of the expert.
Corollary 5. When λ ∈ (0, λ¯), with λ¯ = [ (ls−lm)(ls−rm)
(ls−rs)(lm−rm) − α]−1, the most profitable equi-
librium outcome is the nonuniform-price equilibrium outcome described in Corollary 2.
When λ ∈ (λ¯, 1], the most profitable equilibrium outcome is the uniform-price equilibrium
outcome described in Corollary 4. When λ = λ, the expert’s profit in Corollary 2 is equal
to his profit in Corollary 4.
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To select the most profitable equilibrium outcome, it is sufficient to compare the
expert’s profit in Corollary 2, the most profitable uniform-price equilibrium, and Corollary
4, the most profitable nonuniform-price equilibrium.
In a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer can identify the expert’s type from
his price list. Once the expert’s identity is revealed, the fraction of the conscientious
expert, λ, does not play any role in the equilibrium. Therefore, the profit of the expert in
Corollary 4 does not depend on λ. In contrast, the expert’s profit in Corollary 2 increases
in λ. This is because in the uniform-price equilibrium, when the expert is more likely
to be conscientious, the consumer’s probability of having a serious problem upon being
recommended a repair offer is higher; hence, his willingness to pay is higher. When λ
is smaller than some threshold λ¯, the expert’s profit in Corollary 4 is higher than in
Corollary 2. When λ is greater than the threshold λ¯, his profit is higher in Corollary 2
than in Corollary 4. Figure 1 plots both types of expert’s profits in the uniform-price and
nonuniform-price equilibria as a function of λ.
Next, the efficiency of the most profitable equilibrium as a function of λ is analyzed.
Proposition 3. The market efficiency is not monotonic in λ.
Recall that market inefficiency is measured as the social loss from an unresolved prob-
lem. When λ is less than λ¯, the market is in the nonuniform-price regime. The social
loss is W = α(1− λ)(1− γ∗)(ls − rs), which results from the consumer’s rejection of the
serious treatment offered by the selfish expert. When λ is above λ¯, the market is in the
uniform-price regime. The social loss is W = α(1 − λ)(ls − rs), which results from the
selfish expert’s rejection of the treatment for the serious problem.
In both regimes, the minor problem is always repaired and the social loss is due to
an unresolved serious problem. In the nonuniform-price regime, the serious problem is
unresolved with probability (1−γ∗), with 0 < γ∗ < 1, if the consumer is seeing the selfish
20
expert. In the uniform-price regime, the serious problem is unresolved with probability
one if the consumer is seeing the selfish expert. Not surprisingly, the social loss decreases
in λ when λ < λ¯. It jumps up at λ = λ¯ and decreases again in λ when λ > λ¯. Note
when λ ∈ (λ, λ∗), where λ∗ = γ∗, the social loss is higher in a market with conscientious
experts than in a market without conscientious experts. Figure 2 plots the social loss as
a function of λ.
5 Discussion
In sections 3 and 4, I have analyzed equilibria under the assumption E(l) < rs. Under
the alternative assumption, E(l) ≥ rs, there is a unique equilibrium which is efficient. In
the equilibrium, both types of expert post a single price E(l) and always recommend to
repair the problem at this price; the consumer will accept E(l) with probability one. When
E(l) < rs, a social loss rises in either uniform-price or nonuniform-price equilibria. This
is because the selfish expert cannot credibly commit to always repairing the consumer’s
problem at E(l). Although committing to repairing both problems at E(l) allows the
selfish expert to extract the maximum possible social surplus, ex post he always refuses
to repair the serious problem at E(l). When E(l) ≥ rs, the selfish expert’s ex ante and
ex post incentives are aligned and, therefore, the equilibrium is efficient.
In the monopoly setting, there is always a social loss resulting from the interaction be-
tween the consumer and the selfish expert. Will the social loss disappear in a competitive
setting? Consider a market with a continuum of experts. The fraction of conscientious
experts is λ and the fraction of selfish experts is 1−λ. Take the same game structure and
allow experts to compete in price lists before a consumer’s visit. Assume the condition
E(l) < rs holds and the search cost is high so that the consumer does not search again
after being recommended a treatment offer by an expert. I require a conscientious expert
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to break even ex ante.
The nonuniform-price equilibria cannot be sustained in a competitive market. In
a nonuniform-price equilibrium, the consumer surplus from a repair by a conscientious
expert is higher than a selfish expert. Therefore, in a market with many experts, if the
consumer can infer an expert’s type, he will never visit selfish experts. The nonuniform-
price equilibria collapse.
A uniform-price equilibrium outcome may survive under some parameter configura-
tions. For example, when 0 < α < min{ rs−lm
ls−lm ,
lm−rm
rs−rm } and
(1−α)(rs−rm)
ls−αrs−(1−α)rm < λ < 1, there is
a uniform-price equilibrium outcome. In the equilibrium, each expert posts a single price
equal to the expected treatment cost αrs + (1− α)rm. Let E(r) denote αrs + (1− α)rm.
A conscientious expert always recommends this price to a consumer. A selfish expert
recommends this price to a consumer when his problem is minor and refuses to treat the
consumer when the problem is serious. A consumer always accept a repair offer at E(r).
The condition 0 < α < min{ rs−lm
ls−lm ,
lm−rm
rs−rm } ensures that price E(r) is smaller than
lm. Hence, a consumer will always accept this repair offer. The driving force behind
this equilibrium is similar as in the monopoly setting. In a competitive setting, a selfish
expert might want to undercut his price to p′ < E(r). Doing so will signal that he is selfish
but he might gain from attracting more consumers. If a consumer visits this deviating
selfish expert, he will enjoy a lower price when his problem is minor. But the consumer
will suffer from a higher rejection rate if the problem is serious. When there are enough
conscientious experts, say, (1−α)(rs−rm)
ls−αrs−(1−α)rm < λ < 1, a consumer will never visit an expert
who posts a price lower than E(r). Hence, a selfish expert will not deviate to a lower
price. In this equilibrium, there is still a social loss equal to α(1− λ)(ls − rs).
The result that only the uniform-price equilibrium outcomes might survive in a com-
petitive market implies that price dispersion across problems may decrease in the intensity
of competition. Empirical test about this prediction might be interesting.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study credence goods markets with selfish and conscientious experts. I
identify two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equilibria.
In uniform-price equilibria, the consumer cannot infer the expert’s type from a price
list. The consumer’s problem will always be repaired if he is treated by a conscientious
expert. If he is treated by a selfish expert instead, only the minor problem will be resolved;
the serious problem will be rejected by the selfish expert because the price is too low to
cover the treatment cost.
In nonuniform-price equilibria, the consumer can infer the expert’s type from the
posted price lists; the conscientious expert posts a single price for different repairs whereas
the selfish expert posts two different prices. The problem will be always resolved if the
expert is conscientious. If the expert is selfish, the minor problem will be repaired with
probability one but the serious problem will be left unresolved with a positive probabil-
ity. This is because the serious treatment offer is so expensive that the consumer will
sometimes reject it.
Market efficiency does not always increase with the fraction of the conscientious expert.
A high fraction of the conscientious expert may induce a free-riding problem; that is, the
selfish expert may overcharge the consumer with a minor problem and dump the consumer
with a serious problem. When the efficiency loss caused by the selfish expert exceeds the
efficiency gain contributed by the conscientious expert, more conscientious experts reduce
efficiency.
I have examined a static model with two types of expert. My future research may
be a study of a dynamic model. In a multiple-period setting, the selfish expert has a
reputation concern which may discipline his current behavior. It may be interesting to
study the selfish expert’s pricing and recommendation strategies in different periods.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is divided into 4 steps. Step 1 proves that given the
expert’s strategy described in Proposition 1, the consumer will always accept the repair
offer. Step 2 describes the consumer’s equilibrium strategy following a price deviation.
Step 3 proves that given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert’s strategy described
in Proposition 1 is optimal. Step 4 shows that given other players’ strategies, the consci-
entious expert’s strategy is optimal.
Step 1. Upon being recommended a repair offer at p ∈ [lm, αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) ], the consumer’s
belief of having a serious problem is Pr(li = ls|p) = Pr(p|li=ls)Pr(li=ls)Pr(p|li=ls)Pr(li=ls)+Pr(p|li=lm)Pr(li=lm) ,
where Pr(p|li = ls) and Pr(p|li = lm) stand for the probability that the consumer is rec-
ommended a repair offer at p in state s and m, respectively. According to Proposition 1,
in state s, only the conscientious expert offers to repair the problem at p; in state m, both
types of expert offer to repair the problem at p. Therefore, Pr(p|li = ls) = λ, the prob-
ability of a conscientious expert, and Pr(p|li = lm) = 1. Consequently, if recommended
p, the consumer has a serious problem with probability Pr(li = ls|p) = αλαλ+(1−α) . If the
problem is left unsolved, the consumer’s expected loss is therefore αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) . Because
price p is at most αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) , the consumer will accept it.
Step 2. Now I characterize the consumer’s equilibrium strategy in the continuation
game following a deviation p′ 6= p. If recommended p′ ∈ (p, ls), the consumer believes with
probability one that he is seeing a selfish expert. In addition, he believes that his problem
is minor for p′ ∈ (p, rs) and is serious with probability α for p′ ∈ [rs, ls]. If recommended
p′ ∈ [rm, p), the consumer believes that he is seeing a conscientious expert and he has a
serious problem with probability α. Based on these beliefs, the consumer will only accept
a repair offer p′ ∈ [rm, p). Accepting a repair offer p′ ∈ (p, rs) will result in a loss lm − p′;
under assumption E(l) < rs, accepting a repair offer p
′ ∈ [rs, ls] will also result in a loss
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E(l)− p′.
Step 3. The selfish expert.
(i) In the continuation game following p, the selfish expert will make a repair offer at
p only in state m. The assumption E(l) < rs implies
αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) < rs. Since p is at most
αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+(1−α) , p < rs. Therefore, the selfish expert will decline to repair the problem at p
in state s. Clearly, p is higher than the minor problem’s treatment cost, rm, and therefore
the selfish expert will recommend p in state m.
(ii) The selfish expert will post a uniform price list p ∈ [lm, αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) ]. Any deviation
p′ < p is not profitable: given that the consumer accepts p with probability one, offering
a price p′ < p will not increase the acceptance probability but will reduce profit. Any
deviation p′ > p will be rejected and result in zero profit.
Step 4. The conscientious expert.
(i) When k ≥ rs
ls
, the conscientious expert has a positive payoff in both states by
repairing the problem at p. Therefore, he will always offer to repair the problem at p.
(ii) The conscientious expert will post p ∈ [lm, αλls+(1−α)lmαλ+(1−α) ]. The argument is similar
as that in (ii) of step 3. A deviation p′ < p cannot improve acceptance probability but
will result in a lower profit. A deviation p′ > p will be rejected by the consumer and
result in zero payoff. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is divided into 4 steps. Step 1 shows that given the
expert’s strategy specified in Proposition 2, the consumer’s strategy in Proposition 2 is
optimal. Step 2 specifies the consumer’s beliefs and equilibrium strategy after a price
deviation. Step 3 shows that given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert’s strategy
is optimal. Step 4 shows that given other players’ strategies, the conscientious expert’s
strategy is optimal.
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Step 1. The consumer’s equilibrium response.
(i) The consumer’s loss from the problem is at least lm. His surplus from accepting a
repair offer at lm is nonnegative. Hence accepting price lm is the consumer’s best response.
(ii) Next, suppose that the consumer is offered a repair at ps ∈ [rs, ls]. According to
the selfish expert’s strategy in Proposition 2, in state s, he offers to repair the problem at
ps with probability one, and in state m, offers to repair the problem at ps with probability
β. Using Bayesian updating, the consumer infers that he has a serious problem with
probability
Pr(li = ls|ps) = Pr(ps|li = ls)Pr(li = ls)
Pr(ps|li = ls)Pr(li = ls) + Pr(ps|li = lm)Pr(li = lm) ,
which says Pr(li = ls|ps) = αα+β(1−α) . So if the problem is left unresolved, the consumer’s
expected loss is αls+β(1−α)lm
α+β(1−α) . After substitution by β, this expected loss is equal to ps.
The consumer is indifferent between accepting or rejecting ps. Therefore, accepting ps
with probability γ = lm−rm
ps−rm is a best response.
(iii) Finally, suppose that the consumer is offered a repair price pc. According to the
conscientious expert’s strategy in Proposition 2, the consumer retains the prior belief, α, of
having a serious problem. When the problem is left unresolved, the consumer’s expected
loss is E(l). The assumption E(l) < rs implies that lm +
α
1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ) < E(l).
Because lm +
α
1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ) is the upper bound of pc, the consumer will accept pc
with probability one.
Step 2. The consumer’s equilibrium strategy after a price deviation.
Now I characterize the consumer’s equilibrium strategy in the continuation game fol-
lowing a price deviation p′ /∈ {(lm, ps)}
⋃{pc}. If p′ < pc, the consumer believes that the
expert is conscientious with probability one and the problem is serious with probability
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α. If p′ > pc, the consumer believes that the expert is selfish. In addition, he believes
that his problem is minor for p′ ∈ (pc, rs) and is serious with probability α for p′ ∈ [rs, ls].
Given his beliefs, the consumer’s optimal strategy in the continuation game following p′
is to accept p′ < pc and reject p′ > pc.
Step 3. The selfish expert’s equilibrium strategy.
(i) Given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert will post a price list (lm, ps),
ps ∈ [rs, ls].
First, I show that the selfish expert will not mimic the conscientious expert’s price
list. The selfish expert’s equilibrium payoff is
us(lm, ps) = α(ps − rs)( lm − rm
ps − rm ) + (1− α)(lm − rm).
If he mimics the conscientious expert’s price list pc ∈ [lm, lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm )], the
selfish expert will recommend pc only in state m since pc < rs (step 1 (iii) has shown
this). The highest payoff for the selfish expert from pc is us(pc) = (1− α)(pc − rm). The
condition pc ≤ lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm ) implies us(lm, ps) ≥ us(pc).
Next I show that the selfish expert will not post a price p′ /∈ {(lm, ps)}
⋃{pc}. By
step 2, a repair price at p′ < pc will be accepted. However, such a price deviation is less
profitable than the selfish expert’s equilibrium price list. A repair price at p′ > pc will be
rejected and result in zero profit.
(ii)Given other players’ strategies, the selfish expert’s recommendation strategy in the
continuation game following (lm, ps) is optimal.
In state s, repairing the problem at ps results in a nonnegative profit
(ps−rs)γ = (ps−rs)( lm−rmps−rm ); whereas, repairing the problem at lm results in a loss lm−rs.
In state m, the selfish expert is indifferent between offering to repair the problem at
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lm and at ps. The repair offer lm is accepted with probability one and results in a positive
payoff lm − rm. The repair offer ps is accepted with probability γ and results in a payoff
(ps − rm).γ = lm − rm.
Step 4. The conscientious expert’s equilibrium strategy.
(i) Given other players’ strategies, the conscientious expert will post a single price
pc ∈ [lm, lm + α1−α(ps − rs)( lm−rmps−rm )].
First I show that the conscientious expert will not mimic the selfish expert’s price list.
The conscientious expert’s equilibrium payoff is uc(pc) = pc+α(kls−rs)+(1−α)(klm−rm).
If the conscientious expert mimics the selfish expert’s price list (lm, ps), the highest payoff
he can obtain is uc(lm, ps) = lm + α(kls − rs) + (1 − α)(klm − rm); this is because when
k is sufficiently big (more precisely k ≥ rs
ls
), the conscientious expert will bear a financial
loss to repair the consumer’s problem. Clearly, uc(pc) ≥ uc(lm, ps).
I now show that the conscientious expert will not post a price p′ /∈ {(lm, ps)}
⋃{pc}.
By step 2, a price p′ < pc will be accepted, but is less profitable than pc. A price p′ > pc
will be rejected and result in zero payoff.
(ii) In the continuation game following pc, the conscientious expert will always offer to
repair the problem at pc. Again, when k is sufficiently big (k ≥ rsls ), repairing the problem
at pc results in a positive payoff in both states. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 5. In Corollary 2, the selfish expert’s profit is pis = (1 − α)(p − rm),
with p = αλls+(1−α)lm
αλ+1−α . The conscientious expert’s profit is pic = p− [αrs + (1− α)rm].
In Corollary 4, the selfish expert’s profit is
pis = α(ls − rs) lm − rm
ls − rm + (1− α)(lm − rm).
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The conscientious expert’s profit is
pic = lm +
α(ls − rs)(lm − rm)
(1− α)(ls − rm) − [αrs + (1− α)rm].
Both types of expert’s profits in Corollary 2 are higher than that in Corollary 4 if
and only if α < rs−lm
ls−lm and λ >
1
(ls−lm)(ls−rm)
(ls−rs)(lm−rm)−α
. The condition α < rs−lm
ls−lm is automatically
satisfied under the assumption E(l) < rs. Q.E.D.
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